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Abstract
The Median Voter Theorem is an extremely popular result in Political Economy
that holds only if the policy space is unidimensional. This assumption restricts
its use to a class of very simple problems. In most applications in the literature
this implied an oversimplification of the problem studied, which is one of the
possible explanations for the lack of empirical support for several predictions
derived with this tool.
In this paper I show that under suitable restrictions on individual preferences
a Median Voter Theorem can be derived even if the policy space is multidimen-
sional and I derive the comparative statics of the resulting model induced by a
change in the pivotal voter.
I show that this tool can invalidate the predictions of the Meltzer-Richard
model of size of goverment and that it can be useful to study other Political
Economy problems that cannot be analyzed using the traditional framework,
including games in which players have a richer strategy set than the policy
vector to be chosen.
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1. Introduction
The model of electoral competition proposed by Downs (1957) is a sim-
ple and useful tool that has proved to be extremely successful in the Political
Economy literature. The model delivers very strong predictions: under suitable
assumptions the Median Voter Theorem states that the unique equilibrium is
the policy that is most preferred by the median voter, which implies that the
levels and the comparative statics of the political equilibrium reduces to the
IThis blabla....
Email address: valerio.dotti@ucl.ac.uk (V. Dotti)
1Address: Department of Economics, University College London, Drayton House, 30 Gor-
don St, London WC1H 0AX, United Kingdom.
Preprint submitted to MPRA: Working Paper December 17, 2014
2ones of a single pivotal individual. The ease of calculation and interpretation of
this prediction had to face a general lack of empirical support. A famous exam-
ple is given by an influential paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981), who have
shown that in a simple general equilibrium economy the size of the governmen-
tal expenditures is monotonic increasing in the mean to median income ratio.
The large body of empirical studies2 that has followed their paper has provided
very little support to this hypotesis, with a majority of these analyses showing
no statistically significant relationship between the two variables of interest and
a number of papers that found a significant relationship but with opposite sign
in comparison with the one implied by the Metlzer and Richard result.
A possible explanation for this poor performance of the model is a direct
consequence of the restrictive assumptions that one has to impose in order
to achieve the existence of a Majority Voting equilibrium in Downsian model,
and one in particular is relevant for this and for several other examples: the
unidimensionality of the policy space. In Melzer and Richard’s paper a crucial
consequence of this restriction is that the policy space is made of two variables:
a linear tax rate and a lump-sum grant, that are connected by a balanced
governmental budget constraint such that the effective choice of voters is reduced
to a unidimensional policy space. The oversimplification of this setting is evident
in several aspects. For instance in most countries direct redistribution is just one
component of governmental spending and does not usually represent the largest
share, given that usually expenditures in direct provision of Public Goods and
services and other welfare policies accounts for a larger share of the public
budget. Moreover the choice of a very simple tax system is likely to influence
the result.
Unfortunately the attempt to model the political interaction in a Downsian
model when the policy space is multidimensional has to face extremely burder-
some assumptions in order to achieve existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
(see section 2). Following a successful stream of literature (Levy 2004, 2005,
Roemer, etc.) my approach is to make the political interaction slightly more
complex (and realistic) in comparison with the one implied in Downsian models
by introducing coalitions (or factions) as intermediate bodies between the voters
and the policies that have to be implemented.
The crucial idea of this approach is that individual citizens have limited
ability to commit to specific policies, but they are allowed to form coalitions
whose role is to increase the space of policies that a faction can credibily commit
to implement after elections, namely a coalition can propose any policy in the
Pareto set of its members. This assumption is common in the recent Political
Economy literature (see Levy 2004, 2005, Roemer 1999).
In this paper I do not explicitly model the process of coalition formation,
but I require coalitions to be stable in a peculiar and relatively weak way: a
coalition A is stable if there is at least a vector of policies x in its Pareto set
such that there is no other vector of policies x′with the following features: (i)
2For a review of the literature about this topic see de Mello, Tiongson 2006.
3x′ makes each member of a subcoalition A′ ⊂ A strictly better off with respect
to x; (ii) x′ is in the Pareto set of the subcoalition A′; (iii) x′ is preferred to x
by the society as a whole according to some social preference relation (that is
going to be Majority Voting); (iv) there is no policy x′′ in the Pareto set of the
complementary subcoalition A\A′ that is preferred to x′ by the society. The
details of this concept of stability will be given in section 2, but this description
is sufficient to understand how flexible this concept of stability is: it is very
unlikely that a coalition can be stable if for any policy that this coalition can
put forward a subcoalition can deviate and propose a policy that makes all
its member strictly better off (i) (ii), that is supported by the overall society
against the policy initially proposed (iii) and such that the remaining members
of the original coalition do not have access to any alternative that represents a
“credible threat” and that can discourage this deviation (iv).
In this paper I show that under this notion of stability and some specific as-
sumptions on individual preferences a Median Voter Theorem and a monotone
comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes can be derived in a multidimen-
sional policy space. This result may be used to shed light on the effect of the
restriction of unidimensionality of the policy space in some common applications
in the literature.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing lit-
erature about models of Political Economy in a multidimensional policy space
and highlights why none of the existing models is suitable to analyze sufficiently
complex problems of comparative statics. In section 3 I describe the model of
political interaction and the notion of stability that I will use in the rest of the
paper and the restriction on individual preferences that I need to impose. In
section 4 I present the two main results of this paper: the Generalized Median
Voter Theorem and the Monotone Comparative statics of the equilibrium out-
come; moreover I show how my findings can be interpreted as a generalization
of some results in the literature, I also describe some features of the coalition
structures that can emerge in equilibrium and of the Social Choice function that
is implied by this model. Section 5 introduces a generalization of the model in
which a more complex game is played such that agents do not only vote over
different policy vectors but they also have access to a richer strategy space. I
show that when the resulting game has some specific characteristics (similar to
the ones of a game with strategic complementarities) a monotone comparative
statics result similar to the one in section 4 can be derived. Section 6 describes
two possible applications: the first one shows how the result in Meltzer and
Richard’s paper is not robust to a small change in the environment and that
in a rather simple but more realistic setting their monotonicity result cannot
be achieved or if it is it has the opposite direction in comparison with the one
they derive in their simpler setting. This result may help to shed light on the
reasons that underpin the lack of empirical support to the main prediction of
their model. The second one is an application of the extension in section 5 and
it shows that interesting prediction can be derived if a famous game, namely the
Arms Race, is played in a Political Economy framework. Sections 6 concludes
providing some comments about the importance and the limits of the results in
4the paper.
2. Literature
The seminal contributions of Hotelling (1929) , Black (1948) and Downs
(1957) gave rise to the success in the Political Economy literature of the so-
called Downsian models of political competition, which proved to be extremely
successful and it is still popular in recent applications. The reason of this success
relies in the simple and powerful result that this model delivers under suitable
restrictions on individual preferences: the Median Voter Theorem. The crucial
consequence of this result is that the equilibrium choice is going to be the policy
that is most preferred by a single individual (Pivotal voter or Condorcet winner),
which is the median individual. This implies in turn that all predictions about
levels and comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes are very easy to
derive and to interpret in relations to the changes of the identity and preferences
of the pivotal individual.
Unfortunately it is well known that the conditions for the existence of a
Condorcet winner in a multidimensional policy space are extremely burdensome
(see Plott 1967; Davis, DeGroot, Hinich 1972; and Grandmont, 1978). This
implies that in order to study problems that are characterized by a sufficiently
rich policy space one has to rely to an alternative model of political interaction.
In the Political Economy literature there are several examples of models that
meet this requirement; in this section I will mention the most popular ones and
explain why none of them is suitable to answer questions about the compar-
ative statics of the equilibrium outcomes if the number of available policies is
sufficiently large.
The first and popular example is given by Citizen-Candidate models first
proposed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997); this
class of models is based on the assumption each voter can run for elections but
she cannot commit to any policy that is not in her set of ideal points. Under
this (rather restrictive) assumption the existence of a political equilibrium is
ensured, but multiplicity of equilibria3 is a typical outcome. For instance with
the same set of voters there may be equilibria with only one candidate running
unopposed, equilibria with two candidates or more, and each of these cases is
characterized by a different set of policies that are implemented in equilibrium.
This implies that the model is not suitable to answer questions about policy
outcomes and their comparative statics because the set of policy vectors that
can be equilibria is usually too large to deliver any useful prediction. The
problem of multiplicity is shared with the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium
(PUNE) proposed by Roemer (1999).
3There is a particular case, highlighted in Besley and Coate (1997) in which the Citizen
Candidate model delivers a unique equilibium. In section 4.3 I describe this case and show
that it can be interpreted as an extreme case of the model I present in this paper.
5The model developed by Levy (2004, 2005) is based on the idea that cit-
izens can expand their ability to commit to policies different from their own
ideal point by forming coalitions such that each coalition can propose any pol-
icy that is in the Pareto set of its members. A peculiar notion of coalition
stability ensures existence of an equilibrium in a multimensional policy space
even if the individual preferences are relatively complex (i.e. individuals differ
in two paramenters that enter their utility function). On the other hand the
predictions about levels and comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes
can be derived analytically only for problems in which the policy space or the
individual preferences are restricted in such a way that a very small number of
policy vectors can be chosen in an equilibrium. for instance in the application
described in Levy (2005) there are only three policies that can be be chosen in
any equilibrium). This make Levy’s model unsuitable to analyze more complex
problems.
Finally we have a relative large literature about Probabilistic Voting Models
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Enelow and Hinich, 1989) that under not very
restrictive assumptions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a voting equi-
librium. These models do not deliver any result that makes the political equi-
librium equivalent to the ideal point of a single “pivotal individual”, therefore
the kind of comparative statics that can emerge is generally more complex to
derive and its interpretation is not always straightforward. Given that the equi-
libium outcomes of Probabilistic Models depend in principle on the preferences
of all voters, then all comparative statics exercises have to be related to some
charasteristic of the whole population, for instance a feature of its distribution
that can be summarized by a unidimensional parameter. An example of this
approach is in a paper by Dotti (2014) in which in a model of public provision
of a private good the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcome induced
by a marginal mean preserving spread in the income distribution of voters is
derived.
In order to deal with more general comparative statics questions it is nec-
essary to apply a tool that allows to summarizes the preferences of the society
into the choice of a single individual, such that the comparative statics induced
by changes in the environment can be derived and interpreted easily and condi-
tion for its monotonicity can be imposed in a simple and intuitive way. These
features, that are ensured by the Median Voter Theorem in the unidimensional
case, can be achieved in a multidimensional policy space thanks to the model
presented in this paper.
3. The Model
3.1. Setting
Consider a voting game with n voters (n odd) such that each voter i ∈ N is
denoted by a vector of parameters θi ∈ Θ. Assume (Θ,4) is a totally ordered
set for some transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric order relation 4. This allows
me to establish a total order in the set of players N , such that for all i, j ∈ N
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we have i ≤ j if and only if θi 4 θj . For instance suppose θ is individual income,
then θ ∈ [θ, θ] and Θ is a totally ordered set under the order relation ≤.
Each individual i ∈ N is endowed with a reflexive, complete and transitive
preference ordering i that can be represented by a continuous and θ− concave
utility function4 F : X ×Θ→ R.
The policy space X is a subset of the the d-dimensional real space Rd. In
order to characterize X it is useful to recall some definitions.
Let (L,6) be a partially ordered set, with the transitive, reflexive, antisym-
metric order relation 6. For x and y elements of X, let x ∨ y denote the least
upper bound, or join, of x and y in X, if it exists, and let x ∧ y denote the
greatest lower bound, or meet of x and y in X, if it exists. The set L is a lattice
if for every pair of elements x and y in L, the join x∨ y and meet x∧ y do exist
as elements of L. Similarly, a subset X of L is a sublattice of L if X is closed
under the operations meet and join. A sublattice X of a lattice L is a convex
sublattice of L, if x 6 z 6 y and x, y in X implies that z belongs to X, for
all elements x, y, z in L. Finally, a sublattice X of S is complete if for every
nonempty subset X ′ of X, inf(X ′) and sup(X ′) both exist and are elements of
X.
Recall the d-dimensional real space Rd is a partially ordered set under the
transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric order relation ≤5. Moreover Rd is a lattice
given the definition above. Now we have all the elements to characterize the
policy space X. Let X ⊆ Rd be a convex sublattice of Rd, then (X,≤) is a
partially orderet set with order relation ≤. An example of a policy space that
satisfies my assumption is given by the family of sets Y = {y|y ∈ [a, b]d} where
a, b ∈ Rd.
Subset of voters can form coalitions A ⊆ N . The role of coalitions in this
model is to increase the effective policy space available to the voters. Define
pX,A(a) ≡ {b ∈ X : b i a ∀i ∈ A, b i a ∀i ∈ A} to be the set of allocation
in X that are Pareto superior to a for coalition A. We assume that a coalition
can propose any policy in the Pareto set of its members, i.e. xA ∈ P(A) where
P(A) ≡ {a ∈ X : pX,A(a) = }. If a coalition is a singleton then the Pareto set
reduces to the set of ideal points of its unique member (as in a citizen-candidate
model).
3.2. Stability
In order to define a stability in this model we need to characterize a coalition
structure and the preferences of each coalition. A coalition stucture is defined
as a partition P of N , i.e. a set of subsets of N such that  /∈ P, ∪A∈PA = N
and if A,B ∈ P with A 6= B, then A ∩ B = .
4For any function f defined on the convex subset X of Rd , we say that f is concave in
direction v 6= 0 if, for all x, the map from the scalar s to f(x + sv) is concave. (The domain
of this map is taken to be the largest interval such that x + sv lies in X.) We say that f is
i− concave if it is concave in direction v for any v > 0 with vi = 0. See Quah (2007).
5For x, y ∈ Rd x ≤ y if and only if xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, 2, ..., d.
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We define a complete social preference relation  and  such that  is
irreflexive i.e. x  x and  is reflexive i.e. x  x and the weak and strong
relations are dual, i.e. a  b ⇔ ¬b  a ( is not necessarily transitive). Given
this preference relation we can define PA(a) ≡ {b ∈ A : b  a} where A ⊆ X to
be the strictly preferred set of a in A and K(A) ≡ {a ∈ A : PA(a) = } to be
the set of P −maximal alternatives in A, or the Core.
The crucial aspect of my concept of stability relies on the idea of “credible
threat”. I define SA(a) ≡ {b ∈ P(A′),A′ ⊆ A : b i a ∀i ∈ A′, b  c ∀c ∈
P(A\A′)} to be the set of “credible threats” to a. SA(a) corresponds to the set
of policies that are strictly preferred to a by each member of any subcoalition
A′ ⊆ A and that are preferred by the society to any policy that can be proposed
by the residual coalition A\A′. Using this concept we can define the S-Core
(SK) to be the set of S−maximal alternatives in A. i.e. SK(A) = {a ∈ P(A) :
SA(a) = } is the set of policies that do not face any “credible threat” from
any subcoalition of A.
Using this structure we can now define a concept of stability for a coalition
structure in this game:
Definition 1. A coalition A is stable if and only if SK(A) is nonempty.
It is useful to give an example of why a coalition that does not satisfy the
definition above is unlikely to survive. Suppose SK(A) = . Then for any
a ∈ P(A), ∃b ∈ P(A′) and A′ ⊆ A such that b i a ∀i ∈ A′ and b  c ∀c ∈
P(A\A′), i.e. there exists a subset of the coalition A and a policy b ∈ P(A′)
such that b is strictly preferred to a by all members of the subcoalition A′ and
b is also preferred by the society as a whole to any policy c that the remaining
part of the original coalition A\A′ can propose.
It is natural to consider this coalition structure unstable because for any
policy chosen by this coalition in its Pareto Set (e.g. through some form of
bargaining), the choice of this policy would not be self-enforcing because a
subcoalition A′ can deviate and propose a different policy that makes each
member of the subcoalition strictly better off, that is preferred by the society as
a whole, and such that the remaining part of the original coalition A\A′ cannot
prevent this deviation because there is no feasible “punishment” policy that can
represent a credible threat for the deviators.
Definition 2. A stable coalition structure is a partition P of N such that all
the coalitions Aj ∈ P are stable.
3.3. Preferences
In order to establish our result I need to restrict individual and social prefer-
ences. The kind of restrictions I am going to use are very common in the many
fields of Economic Theory.
About individual preferences the assumptions are Supermodularity (SM) and
Strict Single Crossing Property (SSCP).
Recall that individual preferences can be represented by a function F : X ×
Θ→ R. A function F satisfies:
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(i) SM if and only if F (a∨ b, θ)−F (a, θ) ≥ F (b, θ)−F (a∧ b, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ
and for all a, b ∈ X.
(ii) SSCP in (a, θ) if and only if F (a, θ)− F (b, θ) > F (a, θ)− F (b, θ) for all
a ≥ b and a 6= b, and for all θ, θ ∈ Θ such that θ > θ.
Given the individual preferences described above, I define M(i) to be set of
ideal points of an individual i, i.e. M(i) ≡ {y|y ∈ arg maxx∈X F (x, θi)}6.
About social preferences I am assuming Majority Voting, which is the most
common and widely used criterion in order to establish a social preference re-
lation. Formally a  b if and only if ∑ni=1 1[F (a, θi) ≥ F (b, θi)] > n/2. Notice
that this preference relation does not necessarily imply a tournament, i.e. it is
possible that a 6= b and a ∼ b.
3.4. Equilibrium
Now that the setting is complete we need to define an equilibrium for this
voting game.
Definition 3. A policy vector a ∈ A is a winning policy if and only if it is in
the Core of A, i.e. a ∈ K(A).
Given that our Social Choice function is the Majority Voting this is equiv-
alent to say that a is a Majority Voting Equilibrium of the set of alternatives
A.
Suppose a coalition structure is made of h coalitions Aj for j = 1, 2, ..., h.
then we can define an equilibrium for the voting game as follows.
Definition 4. A pure strategy equilibrium is a coalition structure P∗ = {Aj}hj=1,
a policy profile A∗ = {aj}hj=1 and a set of winning policies W (A∗) ⊆ A∗ such
that: (i) P∗ is a stable coalition structure; (ii)aj ∈ SK(Aj) for all j = 1, 2, .., h;
(iii) W (A∗) is nonempty.
In other words in an equilibrium each coalition is stable and is represented
by one of the policy vectors that makes it stable, and the winning policy is a
Majority Voting equilibrium of the reduced games in which the policy space ir
reduced to A∗ ⊆ X.
4. Results
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 5. (Median Voter Theorem). (i) An equilibrium of the voting game
exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of winning policies W is a subset of the
set of ideal points of the median voter m, i.e. W ⊆ M(m). (iii) If the median
voter has a unique ideal point, this policy is going to be the one chosen in any
equilibrium.
6Notice that the completeness of X implies compactness in the order-interval topology.
On bounded sets in Rd, the order-interval topology coincides with the Eucilidean topology
(Birkhoff 1967). Hence M(i) 6=  for all i ∈ N .
9In order to prove this result we need to introduce some additional notation.
Suppose the coalition A has k members. Consider a set of k×1 weighting vectors
ΛA ≡ {λ : ∑i∈A λi = 1} for each coalitionA and a function G : X×ΛA×Θ→ R
defined as follows: G(x, λ,Θ) =
∑
i∈A λiF (x, θi).
Lemma 6. If F is a continuous function and X is a convex set then any point
a in the Pareto set of A is a solution to maxx∈X G(x, λa,Θ) for some vector
λa ∈ ΛA.
Proof. M.W.G., Proposition 16.E.2.
We need to define four additional objects:
(i) a vectorλA,j such that λA,ji = λi∀i ∈ A : θi < θj , λA,ji = 0 ∀i ∈ A : θi >
θj , λ
A,j
j =
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi;
(ii) a vector λ¯A,j such that λ¯A,ji = λi∀i ∈ A : θi > θm, λ¯A,ji = 0 ∀i ∈ A :
θi < θj , λ¯
A,j
j =
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi;
(iii) the set ΛA,j = {λA,j , λA, λ¯A,j};
(iv) an order relation ≤λgiven by: λ1 ≤λ λ2 iff λ1i ≥ λ2i ∀i ≤ m and λ1i ≤ λ2i
∀i ≥ m. It follows that (ΛA,j ,≤λ) is a totally ordered set.
Lemma 7. If F satisfies SM and SSCP then the Pareto Set P(A) of a coalition
of players A ⊆ N is such that x ∈ P(A) only if x ≥ sup {M(l)} and x ≤
inf {M(h)} where l = inf(A) and h = sup(A) .
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 8. The function G(x, λ,Θ) satisfies (i) SM in x and (ii) SCP in (x, λ)
∀λ ∈ ΛA,j.
Proof. (i) SM. G is the sum of SM functions so it is supermodular (proof in
Milgrom, Shannon, 1994). (ii) SCP. Using the definition of supermodularity,
G is supermodular if and only if: G(x¯, λA,Θ)−G(x, λA,Θ) ≥ G(x¯, , λa,j ,Θ)−
G(x, λa,j ,Θ) ∀x ≥ x, λ ∈ ~Λa,j . Use the definitions of G and λa,j :
[G(x¯, λA,Θ)−G(x, λA,Θ)]− [G(x¯, λA,j ,Θ)−G(x, λA,j ,Θ)] =
= (
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi[F (x¯, θi)− F (x, θi)])− (
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi)[F (x¯, θj)− F (x, θj)] =
=
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi ([F (x¯, θi)− F (x, θi)]− [F (x¯, θj)− F (x, θj)])
Notice that [F (x¯, θi) − F (x, θi)] − [F (x¯, θj) − F (x, θj)] ≥ 0 ∀i ≥ j and λi ≥ 0
∀i hence the sum above is also weakly positive, which implies [G(x¯, λA,Θ) −
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G(x, λA,Θ)]− [G(x¯, λA,j ,Θ)−G(x, λA,j ,Θ)] ≥ 0. Similarly one can show that
this is also true for (λA, λ¯A,j)and (λA,j , λ¯A,j). Finally notice that given that X
is a convex sublattice of Rd and x ≤ x˜ ≤ x¯, then x˜ ∈ X.
Lemma 9. If x ∈ P(A) then ∃x′ ∈ P(A≤j) with A≤j = {i ∈ A : i ≤ j} such
that x′ ≤ x.
Proof. Milgrom-Shannon’s monotone comparative statics implies: M˜(A, λ) =
arg maxx∈X,λ∈ΛG(x, λ,Θ) is monotone nondecreasing in λ. Hence ∃x′ ∈ M˜(A′, λA,j)
such that x′ ≤ x. Given that, together with the θ − concavity of F and the
convexity of X (which together imply a convex utility possibility set), using the
result in Mas Colell, Proposition 16.E.2, it follows that x ∈ P(Aj), i.e. x is in
the Pareto set of coalition Aj = {i ∈ A : i ≤ j}. Q.E.D.
Notice that we cannot exclude that x′ = x.
Lemma 10. If x′ ∈ M˜(A, λA,j) and x ∈ M˜(A′, λA,j) and x′ ≤ x, x′ 6= x , then
F (x′, θj) ≥ F (x, θj) and F (x′, θi) > F (x, θi) ∀i < j.
Proof. We know x′ ≤ x and G(x′, λA,j ,Θ) ≥ G(x, λA,j ,Θ) from Monotone
comparative statics. Suppose F (x′, θj) < F (x, θj). Then it must be true that∑
i∈A λ
A,j
i [F (x
′, θi)− F (x′, θi)] > F (x′, θj) − F (x, θj). Using
∑
i∈A λ
A,j
i = 1
the above can be rearranged as follows:∑
i∈A
λA,ji ([F (x
′, θi)− F (x′, θi)]− [F (x′, θj)− F (x, θj)]) > 0
. Notice that x′ ≤ x and i ≤ j ∀i ∈ A, hence SSCP implies [F (x′, θi)− F (x′, θi)]−
[F (x′, θj)− F (x, θj)] ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ A and hence∑
i∈A
λA,ji ([F (x
′, θi)− F (x′, θi)]− [F (x′, θj)− F (x, θj)]) ≤ 0
which leads to a contradiction. Hence it must be true that F (x′, θj) ≥ F (x, θj).
Given that x′ ≤ x, x′ 6= x, SSCP implies F (x′, θi) > F (x, θi) ∀i < j.
Lemma 11. The coalition Am (could be a singleton) that includes the median
voter m is stable only if am ∈M(m).
Proof. Suppose am /∈M(m) (A1).
(i) If am ≥ xm(≤) for any xm = inf{M(m)} and am ∧ xm ∈ P(Am). A1
implies F (xm, θm) > F (a
m, θm). SSCP implies F (xm, θi) > F (a
m, θi) and
xm i am ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm(≥). Recall that any c ∈ P(Am\A≤m) is c ≥
xm(because of Lemma 7). Hence either c ∈ M(m) or
∑n
i=1 1[F (xm, θi) >
F (c, θi)] > n/2 ∀c ∈ P(A\A′) which implies xm  c→ am /∈ SK(Am).
(ii) If am  xm, am  xm and am ∧ xm ∈ P(A)., Consider am ∨ xm(am ∧
xm). Revealed preferences imply F (xm, θm) ≥ F (am ∨ xm, θm). QSM implies
F (am ∧ xm, θm) ≥ F (am, θm). SSCP implies F (am ∧ xm, θi) > F (am, θi) ∀i ∈
N : θi ≤ θm. Recall that any c ∈ P(Am\A≤m) is c ≥ xm ≥ am ∧ xm. Hence
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either c ∈ M(m) or ∑ni=1 1[F (am ∧ xm, θi) ≥ F (c, θi)] > n/2 which implies
am ∧ xm  c.
(iii) If and am ∧ xm /∈ P(Am). am ∧ xm. Recall that X is a convex set
and F (x, θ) is θ − concave, hence as am ∈ Am it has to be the solution to a
problem in the form am ∈ arg maxx∈X G(x, λm,Θ). Now if am ∧xm is not part
of the Pareto set of Am, consider the following alternative: x˜ ∈ M˜(A, λam,m)
(see Lemma 3). We know from Lemma 3 that x˜ ≤ am. First of all notice that
M˜(A, λam,m) = M˜(A′, λ′) for some λ′, which imples that x˜ ∈ P(A′), i.e. it
is in the Pareto set of A′. We need to show that x˜ 6= am and that x˜ i am
∀i ∈ A′. Suppose x˜ = am → am ∈ P(A′). But from point (b) we know that
F (am ∧ xm, θi) > F (am, θi)∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm → am /∈ P(A′) →Contraddiction.
Hence x˜ 6= am and x˜ ≤ am. Moreover, Lemma 4 implies x˜ m am. This means
that F (x˜, θm) ≥ F (am, θm) and because x˜ 6= am SSCP implies F (x˜, θi) >
F (am, θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm. Recall that any c ∈ P(Am\A≤m) is c ≥ xm ≥ x˜.
Hence either c ∈ M(m) or ∑ni=1 1[F (x˜, θi) ≥ F (c, θi)] > n/2 which implies
x˜  c→ am /∈ SK(Am).
Now Suppose am ∈M(m), and in particular say am = x¯m = sup{M(m)} (=
xm inf{M(m)}). Consider any coalition A≤m such that θi < θm(≥) ∀i ∈ A≤m.
From Lemma 7 we know that any b ∈ P(A≤m) it must be true that b ≤ xm(≥).
Optimality implies F (xm, θm) > F (b, θm). SSCP implies F (xm, θi) ≥ F (b, θi)
and xm i b ∀i ∈ N : θi ≥ θm(≤). Hence
∑n
i=1 1[F (xm, θi) ≥ F (b, θi)] > n/2
∀b ∈ P(A≤m) which implies xm  b ∀b ∈ P(Am)→ am ∈ SK(Am).
Finally Consider any coalition Am such that θi ≤ θm(≥) ∀i ∈ Am and
am = xm(xm). From Lemma 7 we know that any b ∈ P(Am) it must be true that
b ≤ xm(≥ xm). This implies F (xm, θm) > F (b, θm). SSCP implies F (xm, θi) >
F (b, θi) and xm i b ∀i ∈ N : θi ≥ θm(≤). Hence
∑n
i=1 1[F (xm, θi) ≥
F (b, θi)] > n/2 ∀b ∈ P(Am) which implies xm  a ∀a ∈ P(Am)→ PP(Am)(am) =
 ↔ am ∈ K(Am).
Lemma 12. Any coalition Aj that does not contain the median voter m is
stable only if ∃aj such that either of the following is true: (i) aj ∈ M(m); (ii)
aj ≥ xm for all xm ∈M(m); (iii) aj ≤ xm for all xm ∈M(m).
Proof. Suppose aj /∈ M(m) and aj  xm, aj  xm . There are three possible
cases.
(i) say xk ∈ M(k) and ∀k ∈ Aj it is true either xk ≥ aj or xk ≤ aj .
Consider xj such that F (xj , θm) ≥ F (xk, θm). In particular consider xj =
inf{min k ∈ Aj
k > m
xk} or x¯j = sup{max k ∈ Aj
k < m
xk}. Suppose xj = xj (x¯j).
Optimality implies F (xj , θj) > F (a
j , θj). Notice that because xj 6= aj SSCP
implies F (xj , θi) > F (a
j , θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi > θm(<). Notice that both xj and x¯j
are in the Pareto set P(A<j) = P({i ∈ A : i < m}) (P(A>j) = P({i ∈ A : i >
m})) because they are the highest (lower) ideal points of some member of the
subcoalition A<j (see Lemma 7). Finally notice that any policy b ∈ P(Aj\A<j)
must be b ∈M(m) or b ≤ xj (≥) (because of Lemma 7). Hence if xj 6= aj then
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∑n
i=1 1[F (xj , θi) ≥ F (b, θi)] > n/2 ∀b ∈ P(Aj\A<j) which implies xj  b∀b ∈
P(Aj\A<j)→ aj /∈ SK(Aj).
(ii) ∃xk ∈ M(k), k ∈ Aj , θk > θm(<) such that xk  aj , xk  aj (A2).
Consider xk ∧ aj . Notice that (A2) implies xk ∧ aj 6= aj . Optimality implies
F (xk, θk) ≥ F (xk∨aj , θk). SM implies F (xk∧aj , θk) ≥ F (aj , θk). SSCP implies
F (xk ∧ aj , θi) ≥ F (aj , θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm. Hence
∑n
i=1 1[F (xk ∧ aj , θi) ≥
F (aj , θi)] > n/2. which implies xk ∧ aj  a ∀a ∈ P(Aj).
(iii) Is xk ∧ aj part of the Pareto set of A<j? Recall that X is a convex
set and F (x, θ) is θ − concave, hence as aj ∈ P(Aj) it has to be the solution
to a problem in the form aj ∈ arg maxx∈X G(x, λj ,Θ). Now if xk ∧ aj is not
part of the Pareto set of Aj , consider the following alternative: x˜ ∈ M˜(A, λaj ,k)
(see Lemma 6). We know from Lemma 9 that x˜ ≤ aj . First of all notice that
M˜(A, λaj ,k) = M˜(A′, λ′) for some λ′, which imples that x˜ ∈ P(A′), i.e. it
is in the Pareto set of A<j .We need to show that x˜ 6= aj and that x˜ i aj
∀i ∈ A<j . Suppose x˜ = aj → aj ∈ P(A<j). From point (ii) we know that
F (xk ∧ aj , θi) > F (aj , θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm → aj /∈ P(A<j)→ Contraddiction.
Hence x˜ 6= aj and x˜ ≤ aj . Moreover, Lemma 10 implies x˜ j aj . This means
that F (x˜, θj) ≥ F (aj , θj) and because x˜ 6= aj SSCP implies F (x˜, θi) > F (aj , θi)
∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θj . Recall that any c ∈ P(A\A<j) is c ≥ xj ≥ x˜. Hence either
c ∈ M(m) or ∑ni=1 1[F (x˜, θi) ≥ F (c, θi)] > n/2 which implies x˜  c → aj /∈
SK(Aj).
4.1. Proof of main result (Theorem 5)
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem:
(i) An equilibrium exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of win-
ning policies W is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median
voter m, i.e. W ⊆ M(m). (iii) If the median voter has a unique
ideal point, this policy is going to be the one chosen in any equilib-
rium.
Proof. The results in Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 imply that the only policies
that can be proposed by stable coalitions in equilibrium are either am ∈M(m)
or al ≤ am or ah ≥ am. Recall optimality implies F (am, θm) > F (al, θm) and
SSCP implies F (am, θi) > F (a
l, θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≥ θm. Similarly F (am, θm) >
F (ah, θm) and SSCP implies F (a
m, θi) > F (a
h, θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm. Hence a
Majority Voting equilibrium among the proposed policies exists, which is also
the policy chosen in an equilibrium of the coalitional game (i). The total order in
the policy available in all reduced games generated by a stable coalition structure
implies the Majority Voting equilibrium must be always some am ∈M(m) (ii).
The proof of (iii) is straighforward from (i) and (ii).
Corollary 13. (i) The equilibrium policy is in the Core of a winning coalition,
i.e. x ∈ W → x ∈ K(Am) for some winning coalition Am. Moreover, (ii) the
equilibrium policy is in the Core of the reduced game, i.e. x ∈W → x ∈ K(As)
for any equilibrium policy profile As.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 5.
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4.2. Comparative statics
Define E to be the space of possible equilibrium policies, i.e. x ∈ E if and
only if x is a winning policy in the voting game.
Lemma 14. The space of possible equilibrium policies E is a sublattice of X.
Proof. Recall that a subset X of L is a sublattice of L if X is closed under
the operations meet and join. It is easy to show that (i) if Am = {m} and
M(m) ∩ M(i) =  for all i 6= m then E = M(m); (ii) if Am = {m} and
M(m) ∩M(i) 6=  for some i 6= m then E = {xm, xm}; (iii) if Am 6= {m} then
E = {xm, xm}. Recall that M(m) is a convex sublattice of X (see Milgrom,
Shannon 1994). Moreover E = {xm, xm} is a sublattice of X because E ⊆ X
and xm ∨ xm = xm, xm ∧ xm = xm hence {xm ∨ xm, xm ∧ xm} ∈ E therefore it
satisfies the definition of sublattice.
The notion of monotonicity is the same as in Milgrom, Shannon (1994) and
it is related to the Strong Set order, namely given two sets Y, Z we say that Y
is grater than or equal to Z in the Strong Set order (Y ≥s Z) if for any y ∈ Y
and z ∈ Z we have y∨ z ∈ Y and y∧ z ∈ Z. This leads to the second important
statement in this paper.
Theorem 15. (Monotone Comparative Statics). The set of policies E that can
be supported in an equilibrium of the voting game is monotonic nondecreasing
in θm.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 11 consider case (i). Given that E = M(m)
and M(m)is monotonic nondecreasing in θm (Milgrom, Shannon 1994, Theorem
4), then E is as well. Consider cases (ii), (iii). Suppose θm′ > θm, then given
that M(m′) ≥s M(m) (Milgrom, Shannon 1994), then it must be true that
xm′ ≥ xm and xm′ ≥ xm, which implies {xm′ , xm′} ≥s {xm, xm}. Q.E.D.
This result is potentially very important in order to establish the direction
of the change in policy induced by a change in the distribution of θ even if
the individual objective function F is not C2 and therefore the First Order
Conditions of the maximization problem cannot be used in order to calculate
the comparative statics of interest. The reason of this is that the result is based
on Milgrom-Shannon’s monotone comparative statics which is very general. One
caveat is that in order to establish the existence of a Political Equilibrium in
my model the additional assumption of continuity of F makes my comparative
statics result slightly less general than the one in their paper.
4.3. Citizen Candidate Model
A class of models that allow for the existence of a political equilibrium even
if the policy space is multidimensional is the one of Citizen-Candidate models
(Besley and Coate 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). The crucial assumption
of this class of models is that each voter can run for elections as a candidate,
and that each candidate i can credibly commit only to a policy that is in the
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set of her ideal points xi ∈M(i). The main shortcoming of this class of models
if one aims to get predictions about the policy choice of a certain group of
individuals is the multiplicity of equilibria. There is neverthless a case in which
this model delivers a unique equilibrium, and this case is described in Corollary
2 (ii) of Besley and Coates 1997. In their model a citizen faces a cost δ to run
for elections, and:
(ii) if xi is a strict Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives
{xj : j ∈ N} and if xi 6= x0, then a political equilibrium exists in
which citizen i runs unopposed for sufficiently small δ.
Consider one particular stable coalition structure in the model presented in this
paper, namely the one in which each coalition is a singleton. In this case the
Pareto set of each coalition coincide with the set of ideal points of its single
member. In this setting, my assumptions about individual preferences (SM and
SSCP) are sufficient to ensure that there is at least one xm ∈ M(m) who is a
Condorcet winner, as a consequence of Corollary 17 (ii).
Therefore we can conclude that:
(i) the result in Besley and Coate for δ → 0 can be interpreted as a particular
case of equilibrium of the coalitional game model presented in this paper;
(ii) the restrictions on individual preferences I assumed in this paper (SM
and SSCP) are also sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium in which the
median voter run unopposed and implements a policy that is in the set of her
ideal points in the Citizen-Candidate model whenever δ → 0.
4.4. Coalition Structure
In this section I provide some example of stable and unstable coalition struc-
tures in this framework. A key aspect of a stable coalition structure in this model
is given by the following statement.
Lemma 16. Any coalitions that include either (a) individuals with index (i ≤
m) or (b) individuals with index (j ≥ m) is always stable. Therefore a coalition
structure P is stable if each coalition A ∈ P satisfies either (a) or (b).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 and the definition of a
stable coalition structure.
For illustrative purposes it may be useful to analyse a case in which the
policy space is bi-dimensional, i.e. X ⊆ R2+, 5 players i.e. N = 5, m = 3 and
in which individuals have unique ideal points (black dots). Fig. 1A, 1B, 1C all
represent stable coalition structures because condition (a) is satisfied. Notice
that Fig. 1C corresponds to the case of the Citizen-Candidate model described
in the previous section. Finally Fig. 1D represents a case in which condition
(a) is violated, hence it may not represent a stable coalition structure.
4.5 Social Choice function 15
These examples show that under my assumptions about individual prefer-
ences (SM and SSCP) the Median Voter Theorem result that emerge in the
Citizen-Candidate model is robust to settings in which a much richer policy
space is actually available to the voters, and hence it does not crucially depend
on the strong restrictions that the model proposed by Besley and Coates implies
on this aspect of the political interaction.
4.4.1. Conjecture: Ray-Vohra Stability
Under the assumptions of SM and SSCP a coalition structure is stable if
and only if it is stable in the sense of Ray and Vohra (1997).
This concept of strability is similar to the one I propose in this paper, except
for the fact that the profitability from a deviation for a subcoalition is evaluated
keeping into account the possibility of future additional deviations. hence it can
be considered a recursive version of the S-Core.
If this conjecture can be proved a strong link will arise between the political
equilibrium concept presented in this paper and the one in Levy (2004, 2005),
which is based on the stability concept proposed by Ray and Vohra.
4.5. Social Choice function
It is useful to analyse the characteristics of the Social Choice function gen-
erated by this Political Economy model. We know from Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem (Arrow 1950; Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) that there is no So-
cial Welfare Function that satisfies at the same time unrestricted domain (UD),
non-dictatorship (ND), Pareto efficiency (PE), and independence of irrelevant
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alternatives (IIA). Bergson (1976) has shown that Citizen-Candidate class of
models imply a violation of IIA.
In my model IIA is not generally satisfied because the restrictions on the
policy space X (which has to be a convex sublattice of Rd) are crucial in order
to ensure a stable outcome that satisfies the Median Voter theorem.
On the other hand Unrestricted Domain (UD) is obviously violated given
the restrictions on individual preferences, in the same way in which the Spence-
Mirrlees conditions imply a violation of UD in the traditional Median Voter
analysis of Downs (1957).
It is easy to verify that ND and PE are satisfied.
5. Games with Strategic Complementarities
Modify the setting in 2.1 in the following way. Consider a game with k play-
ers j ∈ J with a subset N ⊂ J of n players who are also voters (n odd); Each
player j ∈ J is endowed with a reflexive, complete and transitive preference
ordering i that can be represented by a continuous and θ − concave utility
function F : X ×Θ×∆→ R.
Define ∆ as the set of vectors of strategies that each player can take outside
of the voting game, with typical element δ = {δ1, δ2, ..., δk}, δ ∈ ∆ .
The game can be either (i) simultaneous or (ii) sequential, i.e. at t = 1
voters play the voting game and the policy is chosen; at t = 2 each player j
chooses y ∈ Yj .
The voting game requires minimum changes in the definitions, in particular
individual preference relations over policies have to be defined conditional on
beliefs about other players’ strategies, e.g. i (δ˜−i) describes the preference
relation of individual i given beliefs δ˜−i. Consequently the set of policies that
are Pareto superior to a for coalition A becomes pX,A(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) ≡ {b ∈ X :
b i (δ˜−i)a ∀i ∈ A, b i (δ˜−i)a ∀i ∈ A} and the Pareto set of coalition A
becomes P(A, {δ˜−i}i∈A) ≡ {a ∈ X : pX,A(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) = }. Similarly social
preferences are now given by  ({δ˜−i}i∈N ) such that
a  ({δ˜−i}i∈N )b if and only if
∑n
i=1 1[maxδi F (a, θi, δi, δ˜−i) ≥ maxδi F (b, θi, δi, δ˜−i)] >
n/2.
Similarly one can modify the definitions in section 3 as follows:
PA(a, ({δ˜−i}i∈N )) ≡ {b ∈ A : b  ({δ˜−i}i∈N )a} is the strictly preferred set;
K(A, ({δ˜−i}i∈N )) ≡ {a ∈ A : PA(a, ({δ˜−i}i∈N )) = } is the Core;
SA(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) ≡ {b ∈ P(A′, {δ˜−i}i∈A),A′ ⊆ A : b i (δ˜−i)a ∀i ∈ A′, b 
c ∀c ∈ P(A\A′, {δ˜−i}i∈A)} is the set of “credible threats”
SK(A) = {a ∈ P(A) : SA(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) = } is the S-Core.
Definition 17. A pure strategy equilibrium of this game is:
(a) a coalition structure P∗ = {Aj}hj=1, a policy profile A∗ = {aj}hj=1 and
a set of winning policies W (A∗) ⊆ A∗ such that such that given beliefs about
the strategies y˜: (i) P∗ is a stable coalition structure; (ii)aj ∈ SK(Aj) for all
j = 1, 2, .., h; (iii) W (A∗) is nonempty;
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(b) a strategy profile δ ∈ ∆ such that δi ∈ arg maxδ∈∆i F (x˜, θi, δ, δ˜−i) for
each j 6= m and (x, δm) ∈ arg maxx∈X,δ∈∆m F (x, θm, δ, δ˜−m) for i ∈ m.
With this new definition of an equilibrium for the game we can state the
following result:
Theorem 18. (i) An equilibrium exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of
winning policies W is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median voter m.
(iii) The largest and smallest pure strategy equilibria (and serially undominated
strategy profiles) (a∗m, δ
∗) and (a∗m, δ∗), are monotone nondecreasing functions
of the parameter that identifies the median voter θm.
Proof. See Appendix B.
6. Applications
6.1. Meltzer-Richard revisited
In one influential paper Meltzer and Richard (1981) analyse in a unidimen-
sional political economy model the relationship between income distribution of
a society and the extent of redistributive policies. One famous result in in their
paper is that
[..] An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive
voter increases the size of the government.
In this section I will show how this result does not have to emerge in a political
equilibrium if a richer policy space is available to voters. Moreover I will show
that is the progressivity of the tax sistem that should monotone nondecreasing
in the income of the median voter.
My setup is similar to the one in Meltzer-Richard (MR), with the difference
that the budget of the government is spent not only in in-cash redistribution,
but also in Public Goods. Suppose an individual i has utility function:
Vi = U(ci, 1− hi) + v(Y )
where ci is i’s consumption of private goods, Y is the the quantity of Public
Goods that is provided by the government and hi is i’s hours of work. The tax
system is the same as in MR, namely individual post-tax income is determined
by a linear tax rate t = 1 − x and by a lump-sum grant g. Then the after tax
income will be given by:
ci = xωihi + g
The government has to break even, such that the governmental budget con-
straint is given by:
(1− x)
n∑
j=1
[ωjhj ]− Y − ng ≥ 0
6.1 Meltzer-Richard revisited 18
Assuming that the constraint above is binding in equilibrium we can substi-
tute in the previous one:
ci = xωihi + (1− x)y − Y/n
And then into the individual utility function:
Vi = U(xωihi + (1− x)y − Y/n, 1− hi) + v(Y )
Lemma 19. In the augmented MR model, if income inequality is sufficiently
high, (i) the necessary conditions for the size of the government being monotonic
increasing in the mean/median income ratio cannot be met; Moreover, (ii) the
size of the government is monotonic nondecreasing in the median income (at
constant mean) and (iii) the expenditure in Public goods is nondecreasing in the
median income (at constant mean).
Proof. See Appendix C.
This result suggests that, differently from what Meltzer and Richard claim
in their paper, a society with lower wage inequality may still have a larger
government size in comparison with a more unequal one, but that the former
should have a less progressive tax system.
Lemma 20. In the augmented MR model the progressivity of the tax system is
monotone nonincreasing in the in the median income (at constant mean) if the
tax elasticity of labour supply is not strongly positive.
Proof. Define the tax rate of an individual with income yi as Ti =
(1−x)yi−g
yi
.
The progressivity PRi = PR(x, g, yi) of the tax system is decreasing in ym:PRi =
∂Ti
∂yi
∣∣∣
x,g
= g
y2i
. Recall yi = xhiωi + g. Differentiate w.r.t. dωm to get dym =(
ωm
∂hm
∂ωm
+ hm + ωm
∂hm
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
+ ωm
∂hm
∂g
∂g
∂ωm
)
dωm. Hence
dωm
dym
= 1
/(
∂ym
∂ωm
+ ωm
∂hm
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
+ ωm
∂hm
∂g
∂g
∂ωm
)
>
0 as long as ηhm,t is not strongly positive. Now the derivative of interest is:
∂PRi
∂ym
∣∣∣∣
y
=
(
∂PRi
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
+
∂PRi
∂g
∂g
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
)
dωm
dym
=
=
[
−2g
y4i
(
∂yi
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
− ∂yi
∂g
y
[
∂x
∂ωm
+
1
n
∂Y
∂ωm
])
+
1
y2i
∂g
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
]
dωm
dym
< 0∀i
Recall that ∂yi∂g ≤ 0 because the grant generates a pure income effect, ∂yi∂x is small
negative or positive if ηhm,t is not strongly positive,
∂g
∂ωm
∣∣∣
y
< 0 and ∂x∂ωm
∣∣∣
y
> 0
from Lemma (...). Hence we get: ∂PRi∂ym
∣∣∣
y
< 0. Q.E.D.
6.2 Arms Race in a Democratic country 19
6.2. Arms Race in a Democratic country
Consider a democratic country whose citizens vote about a linear tax rate, a
lump-sum grant and the level of spending in national defence in presence of an
external threating nation. Notice that all citizens have same preferences about
national defence. The utility function of a citizen with income is:
Ui(x, y, Ii, Y ) = f(x, y) + u(ci, li)
where x is the national spending in defence, y is the level of spending of
the rival country, ci is the expenditure in consumption and li is the hours of
leisure enjoyed by citizen i. Following the literature about arms race I assume
fxy ≥ 0, i.e. an increase in expenditures in national defence in a rival country
increases the marginal utility of governmental spending in national defence.,
and ucl ≥ 0. Individual i’s consumption is given by her disposable income such
that ci ≤ (1 − t)hiθi + g and the governmental budget constraint is balanced:
t
∑n
i=1 hiθi ≥ x+ ng.
Lemma 21. If the difference between median and mean pre-tax income is suf-
ficiently small and a change in the tax system that benefit the riches and harm
the poors is implemented by the government, then the same government will also
increase the expenditure in national defence. Moreover in equilibrium all rival
countries will increase their expenditures in national defence.
Proof. See Appendix D.
7. Conclusions
This paper proposes a model of political interaction in which voters can form
coalitions in order to increase the space of policies that can be proposed and in
which this coalitions are required to be stable in a peculiar sense. I show that
the assumptions of Supermodularity and Strict Single Crossing Property of vot-
ers’ objective functions are sufficient for the existence of a political equilibrium
in a multidimensional policy space. Moreover I show that under the same as-
sumptions a version of the Median Voter Theorem holds and as a consequence
a monotone comparative statics result of the equilibrium outcomes is derived.
The paper describes a tool that can be useful to correct the predictions de-
livered by traditional Downsian models for some common Political Economy
questions in the literature and potentially to explain the poor empirical perfor-
mance of these predictions.
A feature that emerges is that the model is sufficiently flexible to deal with
games that are more complex than simple voting games and can deliver inter-
esting answer to questions in the field that cannot be easily analysed in the
traditional framework.
I claim that this results can be applied to addess a number of different
questions in the field and to light shed on some controversial results in the
literature and that it represents an elegant an parsimonious way of dealing
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with one of the most commons problems that emerge if one aims to model
Political Choices in an economic model. Moreover, the model is sufficiently
general to be suitable todescribe many different Political Economy problems
and to incorporate some results that are well established in the literature as
special cases of my framework.
Despite of these achivements the assumptions that must be satisfied in or-
der to prove the two main results of the paper are relatively restrictive so their
applicability should be evaluated in relationship to the credibility of those as-
sumptions in each specific application.
AppendixA. Lemma 5
If F satisfies SM and SSCP then the Pareto Set P(A) of a coalition of players
A ⊆ N is such that x ∈ P(A) only if x ≥ sup {M(l)} and x ≤ inf {M(h)} where
l = min(A) and h = max(A) .
Proof. Suppose y  xl but y ∈ P(A). Because of the optimality of xl and be-
cause X is a lattice, it must be true that F (xl, θl) ≥ F (y∧xl, θl). Supermodular-
ity implies F (y∨xl, θl) ≥ F (y, θl). Notice that y  xl implies y∨xl 6= y. Hence
the Strict Single Crossing Property implies F (y ∨ xl, θi) ≥ F (y, θi) ∀θi > θl.
Given that θi > θl is true for all θ ∈ A, θ 6= θl we have that ∃x ∈ X such
that F (x, θ) ≥ F (y, θ) ∀θ ∈ A and F (x, θ) > F (y, θ) for at least one θ ∈ A,
i.e pX,A(y) 6= . Hence y /∈ P(A). Similarly one can show that x ∈ A only if
x ≤ xh. Q.E.D.
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Define the following game. A nonempty set N indexes the players, and each
player’s strategy set is Si, partially ordered by ≥ . The space of strategy profiles
is then S, and player i has payoff function pii(zi, z−i). Following Milgrom,
Shannon 1994 such a game has (ordinal) strategic complementarities if for every
i: (1) Si is a compact lattice; (2) pii is upper semi-continuous in zi for z−i fixed,
and continuous in z−i for fixed zi; (3) pin is quasisupermodular in zi and satisfies
the single crossing property in (zi; z−i). Say zi = δi, z−i = (x, δ−i) for all i 6= m
and zm = (x, δi), z−m = δ−i.
INCOMPLETE.
AppendixC. Lemma 19
In the augmented MR model, if income inequality is sufficiently high, (i) the
necessary conditions for the size of the government being monotonic increasing
in the mean/median income ratio cannot be met; Moreover, (ii) the size of
the government is monotonic nondecreasing in the median income (at constant
mean) and (ii) the expenditure in Public goods is nondecreasing in the median
income (at constant mean).
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Proof. Suppose there is an internal maximum. Then FOCs of the median voter
imply:
∂Vm
∂x
= Uc(xωmhm + (1− x)y − Y/n, 1− hi)
(
ωmhm − y + (1− x)∂y
∂x
)
= 0
∂V
∂Y
= −Uc(xωihi + (1− x)y − Y/n, 1− hi)/n+ vY
We want to study the comparative statics induced by changes of the median
income ym at constant mean income y. Recall that for C
2 functions a sufficient
condition for the SSCP to apply is ∂
2V
∂xj∂ωi
∣∣∣
y
> 0∀j, i. First of all I will study
the derivative w.r.t. ωm. In this example we have:
Vxωm ≡
∂2V
∂x∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
=
[
Ucc ·
(
xhm + xωi
∂hm
∂ωm
)
− Ucl · ∂hi
∂ωi
](
ωmhm − y + (1− x)∂y
∂x
)
+
+Uc(xωmhm + (1− x)y − Y/n, Y )
(
hm + ωm
∂hm
∂ωm
)
=
Notice that in an internal equilibrium FOCs imply either ωmhm−y+(1−x) ∂y∂x =
0 or Uc(xωmhm + (1−x)y−Y/n, 1−hm)
(
ωmhm − y + (1− x) ∂y∂x
)
= 0. Hence
using FOCs the condition reduces to:
Vxωm > 0↔
[
Ucc ·
(
xhm + xωm
∂hm
∂ωm
)
− Ucl · ∂hm
∂ωm
](
ωmhm − y + (1− x)∂y
∂x
)
> 0
VxY ≡ ∂
2V
∂x∂Y
∣∣∣∣
y
= 0
VY ω ≡ ∂
2V
∂Y ∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
= −Ucc ·
(
xωm
∂hm
∂ωm
+ xhm
)
/n+ Ucl · ∂hm
∂ωm
> 0
VY ω ≡ ∂
2V
∂Y ∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
= −Ucc · x ∂ym
∂ωm
/n+ Ucl · ∂hm
∂ωm
/n > 0
if hm has low wage elasticity and /or Ucl ≈ 0. This implies that V is super-
modular in (x, Y ) and satisfies the SSCP in (x, Y, ω) and hence using Milgrom-
Shannon we know that the set of ideal points is monotone nondecreasing in
ω. Hence in our model of political interaction if the median voter changes to
an individual with higher ω(and hence higher income y) and the average is
constant, the linear tax rate t = (1 − x) will be weakly in equilibrium, as in
Meltzer-Richard. Alternatively if the solution is internal one can check that:
∂x
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
= −Vxω
Vxx
> 0
∂Y
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
= − Vxω
VY Y
> 0
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Vxx ≡ ∂
2V
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
y
=
(
Ucc ·
[
ωmhm + xωm
∂hm
∂x
− y
]
− Ucl ∂hm
∂x
)(
ωmhm − y + (1− x)∂y
∂x
)
VY Y ≡ ∂
2V
∂Y 2
∣∣∣∣
y
= Ucc(1− ∂hm
∂Y
xωm)/n
2 + vY Y
Finally, we can recover the sign of the change in g induced by a marginal increase
in ωm using the budget constraint:
g = (1− x)y − Y/n
hence (assuming that g is differentiable, explain why):
∂g
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
= −y ∂x
∂ωm
− 1
n
∂Y
∂ωm
Define the size of the government as follows:
S(y, ym, x, g) ≡
n∑
i=1
I [(1− x)hiωi − g ≥ 0] ((1− x)hiωi − g)
i.e. the size of the government is the total revenue from taxes.
∂S
∂ωm
∣∣∣∣
y
=
n∑
i=1
1 [(1− x)hiωi − g ≥ 0]
(
− ∂x
∂ωm
yi + (1− x)∂yi
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
− ∂g
∂ωm
)
=
= − ∂x
∂ωm
n∑
i=k
yi + (1− x)
n∑
i=k
(
∂yi
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
)
− n ∂g
∂ωm
=
= − ∂x
∂ωm
n∑
i=k
yi+(1−x)
n∑
i=k
(
∂yi
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
)
−n
(
−y ∂x
∂ωm
+ (1− x)∂y
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
− 1
n
∂Y
∂ωm
)
=
− ∂x
∂ωm
[
k−1∑
i=1
yi − (1− x)
k−1∑
i=1
(
∂yi
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
)]
+
∂Y
∂ωm
=
Rearranging:
= − ∂x
∂ωm
[
k−1∑
i=1
yi (1 + ηyi,t)
]
+
∂Y
∂ωm
=
Now:
dym =
(
ωm
∂hm
∂ωm
+ hm + ωm
∂hm
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
)
dωm
Hence
dωm
dym
= 1
/(
∂ym
∂ωm
+ ωm
∂hm
∂x
∂x
∂ωm
)
> 0
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as long as ηhm,t is not strongly positive.
∂S
∂ym
∣∣∣∣
y
=
[
− ∂x
∂ωm
∑k−1
i=1 yi (1 + ηyi,t)
Vxx
+
∂Y
∂ωm
]
dωm
dym
Consider to extreme case: yi = 0 for all i ≤ j with m ≤ j, yi > 0 for all i > j.
If an internal equilibrium exists this implies Vxx|y = Uccy
(
y − (1− x) ∂y∂x
)
and∑k−1
i=1 yi (1 + ηyi,t) = 0 because
∂hm
∂x = 0, therefore:
∂S
∂ym
∣∣∣
y
> 0.
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Proof. Substitute the individual and the governmental budget constraint into
the utility function. The resulting objective function of citizen i is V (x, y, T ; θi) =
f(x, y) + u ((1− t)hiθi + ty¯ − x/n, 1− hi). First derivatives of V are: Vx =
fx − uc/n; Vt = −uc (hiθi − y¯). Second derivatives at constant y¯ (see definition
of Vij in Appendix B) are: Vtθi =
[
−ucc
(
hi + θi
∂hi
∂θi
)
(1− t) + ucl ∂hi∂θi
]
(yi − y¯)−
uc
(
hi + θi
∂hi
∂θi
)
< 0; Vxθi = −ucc
(
hi + θi
∂hi
∂θi
)
(1 − t) + ucl ∂hi∂θi > 0; Vxt =
ucc (yi − y¯) > 0. Notice that limyi→y¯ Vtθi = 0; limyi→y¯ Vxt = 0; limyi→y¯ Vtxθ >
0. Hence there must be a threshold yˆ(y¯) such that if yˆ(y¯) ≤ ym < y¯ then the
comparative statics is: (i) x is increasing in ym; (ii) g is decreasing in ym; (iii)
the comparative statics of t is ambiguous. This implies that a less progressive
tax system will be implemented and the amount of transfers to poor individu-
als will fall and at the same time the expenditure in national defence will rise.
Moreover, using (SECTION 5) we know that the expenditure in defence of all
other countries must be weakly higher in equilibrium.
———————
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